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ABSTRACT. Human cognition does not rest upon individual minds alone, but is 
distributed across persons, things and time. Archaeology, the discipline of things par 
excellence, has much to offer to researchers interested in cognitive processes. The 
material world is crucial in processes of enculturation and cultural transmission, in 
shaping daily experience and perceptions, and in orienting action. In this chapter, the 
concept of material culture is examined as it is commonly understood today in 
archaeology and material culture studies. Furthermore, the diverse roles of material 
culture in relation to cognition are examined through specific examples from prehistoric, 
historic and contemporary societies.   
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(h1) PSYCHOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY 
Archaeology’s links to psychology are stronger and more diverse than usually 
acknowledged, although the interest to establish such links has been mostly 
unidirectional so far: since the mid-1980s archaeologists have been exploring the 
complex issue of mind and cognition from the material remains of the past—a daunting 
but certainly not impossible task. On the contrary, psychologists have not been 
interested in the lessons that might be obtained from archaeology. They may think that 
since archaeologists work with the material world, they are in a disadvantaged position 
to access the human mind. Also, they may perceive archaeology as a field far removed 
from the theoretical debates that affect other sciences, such as anthropology or 
sociology, which intersect with psychology in several ways. As we will see, neither idea 
is really true.  
The theoretical current known as cognitive or cognitive-processual archaeology 
is responsible for the psychological turn in archaeology, which has had its greatest 
impact among those working in the earliest phases of the evolution of humankind 
(Renfrew and Zubrow 1994; Renfrew and Morley 2009). In fact, the concerns of 
cognitive archaeologists have been basically centered on evolutionary matters, that is, 
the development of cognitive skills in human beings: when did abstract thought, 
aesthetics or the use of material culture as external symbolic storage appear for the first 
time? The field more akin to cognitive archaeology is not cultural but evolutionary 
psychology and cognitive science and, for this reason, this approach will not be 
discussed here. However, also in this case, it has been archaeologists who have 
approached cognitive and evolutionary psychology, rather than the other way round.  
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Another meeting point between archaeologists and psychology (rather than 
psychologists) is learning and the configuration of motor skills: which psychomotor 
changes have to occur so that an apprentice becomes proficient at making wheel-turned 
pots or a certain kind of flaked stone tool (e.g. Roux and Corbetta 1989; Stout 2002)? 
Again, this is not a matter that has to do specifically with cultural psychology per se, but 
with cognitive science (but see Boesch 1993).    
 Beyond the evolution of cognitive skills, the truth is that, at least since the early 
1980s, archaeologists and psychologists have been sharing more concerns than they 
may think: identity, personhood and self (Hernando 2002, Fowler 2004), human and 
social agency (Robb and Dobres 2000), emotion (Tarlow 2000a), perception of the 
environment (Tilley 1994, Ingold 2000), memory (Jones 2007), distributed cognition 
(Malafouris 2004) and enculturation (Hodder and Cessford 2004; Stark et al. 2008) to 
mention but a few.   
 
(h2) CAN ARCHAEOLOGY BE USEFUL FOR CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGISTS?    
  
 Perhaps surprisingly, there has been no attempt of convergence between cultural 
psychology and archaeology. This despite the fact that archaeology—the only science 
that has the methodological tools to study human beings from 2.5 million years ago to 
the present—can contribute to cultural psychology by increasing the number of cultures 
and cultural contexts at the disposal of the psychologist. Archaeology’s potential 
contribution to cultural psychology does not end there—rather, it starts there. The gist 
of archaeology lies in its being the science of material culture par excellence, the 
discipline of things (Olsen 2003: 89), and material culture, as Latour (1991) said of 
technology, is society made durable. The main aim of cultural psychology is to 
understand how the mind is affected by culture. Traditionally, visions of culture as 
proposed by anthropologists have emphasized its immaterial side (ideology, institutions, 
myths, kinship) and, likewise, visions of psychological process as developing on a 
disembodied mind have predominated in psychology (Cole 1998: 118). This 
disembodied image of culture and mind has come under attack during the last decade 
and today many researchers agree in that human beings do not create and live culture in 
an ethereal, ideal void. Their lives and thoughts are inextricably entangled in a material 
world. As a matter of fact, almost everything in the cultural lives of human beings could 
be considered material culture, since there are very few—if any—activities that are not 
materially mediated in one way or the other—even singing or storytelling implies 
materiality: at the minimum, a technique of the body (Mauss 1973).  
 Besides, the particular aim of cultural psychology is closer in one sense, at least, 
to archaeology than to anthropology. According to Shweder and Sullivan (1993: 508) 
“Cultural psychology is the study of constituted or compiled experiences (what Geertz 
has called ‘experience-near’ concepts) in contrast to explicated experiences (‘experience 
distant’ concepts)”. Material culture is all about constituted experiences: there is nothing 
closer to experience than materiality. In recent years, interest among cultural 
psychologists in material culture has increased (Valsiner 2009: 22-24), a fact that has to 
be related with an awareness of the importance of objects in culture. For Michael Cole 
(1998: 144) artifacts, due to their simultaneous material and ideal nature, are the 
fundamental constituents of culture, which in turn is fundamental in shaping cognitive 
processes. It would be unfair to forget, though, that one of the first psychologists to 
point out the relevance of material culture—or tools—was Lev Vygotsky himself. “The 
most significant moment in the course of intellectual development—writes Vygotsky 
(1978: 25)—which gives birth to the purely human forms of practical and abstract 
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intelligence, occurs when speech and practical activity, two previously completely 
independent lines of development, converge”. Practical activity, for Vygotsky, was 
characterized by the use of material tools. Furthermore, he considered practical 
intelligence in children as prior to independent speech, given the existence of this 
practical intelligence in primates as well.  
 However, the difference between humans and apes is the capacity to make 
complex tools by the former, which implies a developed anticipatory cognition. I am not 
referring here to the use of non-modified tools (such as twigs or stones) among primates 
or to the debate on primate cultures (for this see C. Boesch this volume), but to the 
making and use of secondary tools (such as retouched flakes). The first lithic industries 
of 2.5-2 million years ago, although apparently rough, imply a complex and elaborate 
thinking that goes well beyond the abilities of chimpanzees (cf. de la Torre 2004). 
Interestingly, though, as Vygotsky already noted, this sophisticate practical intelligence 
exists before the appearance of speech. In this sense, it is worth noting that for 
archaeologists, evolutionary biologists and philosophers alike, one of the defining 
characteristics of human beings is the capacity to make and use composite tools. Other 
elements, such as a developed speech and symbolic capacity come later. However, 
Vygotsky was right at pointing at the relevance of studying practical intelligence and 
the use of signs together, instead of as two separate phenomena. He did not just 
encourage the study of both signs and things as intertwined, but considered them 
equally important: “speech and action are part of one and the same complex 
psychological function, directed toward the solution of a problem at hand” (Vygotsky 
1978: 25). The elaborate operations involved in the production of early stone tools are 
not possible without some process of signification which is absent in apes. These 
operations comprise two elements that according to Christopher Boesch (this volume) 
distinguish humans from primates: the persistence of cultural traits for extended periods 
of time (bifaces, for instance, used for over a million years) and the presence of non-
adaptive cultural traits: there is more than one way of making a lithic point—technical 
diversity here indicates a cultural logic that goes beyond pure adaptation.  
 Archaeologists, who work with the material results of past human activity, are in 
a privileged position to explore practical intelligence. This is by no means restricted to 
the period before the appearance of speech, inasmuch as in Homo sapiens sapiens non-
verbal behavior continues to play a paramount role. A final quote from Vygotsky leaves 
clear the importance he conceded to tools as an inextricable part of what is to be human: 
“The entire existence of an Australian aborigine depends on his boomerang, just as the 
entire existence of modern England depends on her machines” (Vygotsky and Luria 
1993: 74). Things make people. 
  In this line, my main concern in this chapter will be to show how materiality 
shapes the lives of human beings, mediates their relation with the world, directs their 
actions, triggers or inhibits feelings, educates them in the social environment and 
participate in cognitive processes, such as memory and learning.  
 
(h1) MATERIAL CULTURE, MATERIALITY, DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
 
Psychologist and neuroscientist Merlin Donald wrote: “we cannot have a science of 
mind that disregards material culture as we cannot have an adequate science of material 
culture that leaves out cognition” (Donald 1998: 186). This is widely acknowledged in 
archaeology and material culture studies today. The question at the moment is not as 
much whether mind and materiality are related, but how to envisage that relationship. 
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This relationship is better perceived as symmetrical: we should avoid understanding 
either mind or materiality as having the leading role. It is more an issue of subtle and 
ongoing adaptations between the two (Boesch 1993).  
 Cognitive-processual archaeologists, those who most explicitly draw upon 
psychology and cognitive science in their work, have tended to view material culture as 
a form of “symbolic storage” (Renfrew and Scarre 1998), following Donald’s concept 
of “exographic storage” (see below “Memory and material culture”).  Written texts and 
signs are well known forms of exographic storage, but things can be used for coding 
information as well. They help us remember past events, historical episodes or myths, 
sometimes in a very explicit way, such as the decorated sticks of the Maori, that allowed 
them to remember long genealogies, or the churingas used by Australian aborigines, 
wooden plaques encoding the history of a totem (Rodríguez Mayorgas 2010: 42-45). In 
other cases, the relation between artifacts and information is less similar to textual 
transmission. Artifacts can store and convey non-verbal information about economic 
and political status, age, gender, ethnicity and personal identity (Wobst 1977; Ames 
1984; Schiffer and Miller 1999). Cognitive-processual archaeologists have not been the 
only ones in exploring the capacity of things to transmit meaning. Actually, it was post-
processual or interpretive archaeologists who first draw attention to the fact that 
material culture is meaningfully constituted (Hodder 1982, 1986) and, as such, can be 
decoded. Although cognitive-processual archaeology relies upon cognitive science and 
interpretive archaeology is based on hermeneutics and semiotics (Hodder 1994; Preucel 
2006), the truth is that differences are not as great as one might think. In both cases, 
material culture is perceived as something external that is loaded with meaning and 
manipulated by human actors (or minds).  
 
H2) TOWARDS A SYMMETRICAL APPROACH TO MIND AND MATERIALITY  
 
 Since the early 1980s, many archaeologists and anthropologists have called 
attention to the importance of things in determining culture and have criticized the 
oblivion to which the material has been subjected (see an overview in Olsen 2006). In 
recent years, some of them have insisted that objects are not just important, they have 
agency as well. They are not passive containers of culture. Thus, Chris Gosden has 
noted that it is not necessarily the mind that imposes its form on material objects, but 
very often just the opposite: things shape thoughts (Gosden 2005: 196). Anthropologist 
Alfred Gell (1998) also remarked that material objects, and in particular art, have 
agency. Nevertheless, saying that artifacts have the capacity to affect people does not 
really imply a transformation of the ontological perspective on the relationship between 
mind and matter. As Knappett (2002: 98) has pointed out “in acknowledging that 
objects can be agents and agents can be objects, a dualism between objects and agents 
remains”. A more radical stance, and a real break with previous perspectives, came 
during the last decade with the debates on the limitations of Cartesian or—more 
generally—modernist dualisms. Archaeologists, like practitioners from other disciplines 
(e.g. Butler 1993; Latour 1993; Descola 2005), have critically examined the divides 
established between present/past, individual/collective, subject/object, culture/nature, 
material/immaterial and mind/body. Following the principle of ontological symmetry 
defended by Latour (1993), Law (1991) and Callon (1991) and other proponents of 
Actor-Network Theory in science and technology studies, some archaeologists argue for 
a “symmetrical archaeology” that considers things and people as fundamentally 
inseparable (Olsen 2003, 2007; Shanks 2007; Webmoor 2007; Witmore 2007). This is a 
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radical change with regard to previous theories that espoused the primacy of human 
actors over things and the separation between humans and objects.  
 However, similar views have been defended by other scholars within cognitive 
science and cognitive archaeology (Knappet 2002, 2005; Knappet and Malafouris 2008). 
Andy Clark (2008: 13), for instance, insists that we have to abandon the image of 
ourselves as disembodied, reasoning engines and goes as far as to suggest that “certain 
aspects of the external world... maybe so integral to our cognitive routines as to count as 
part of the cognitive machinery itself” (Clark 2008: 15, author’s emphasis). In turn, 
Lambros Malafouris (2004: 57) emphasizes that human cognition is embodied, situated, 
extended, enacted, distributed and mediated, as opposed to the ethereal and independent 
mind of earlier cognitive archaeologists, which projected itself onto the material world. 
Like symmetrical archaeologists, he considers that the relationship between the world 
and human cognition is one of “ontological inseparability”. To illustrate his point, 
Malafouris (2004: 59) resorts to the potter’s wheel: “the cognitive map of knowledge 
and memory may well be extended and distributed in the neurons of the potter’s brain, 
the muscles of the potter’s body, the ‘affordances’... of the potter’s wheel, the material 
properties of the clay, the morphological and typological prototypes of existing vessels 
as well as the general social context in which the activity occurs”.   
 The material turn of the last decade has made us more aware of the 
inseparability of people and things and the relevance of the material world in shaping 
our cultural and psychological experience. If cultural psychology is the study of “the 
way culture and psyche make each other up” (Shweder and Sullivan 1993: 498), then 
taking the material side of culture seriously should be a must for cultural psychologists.  
In the following section, we will see which are the main characteristics of material 
culture as it is currently understood.  
(h1)  TEN POINTS ON MATERIAL CULTURE 
Material culture is used to think in both an explicit and in an implicit way (Henare et 
al. 2007; Knappet 2005). Cognitive processes are distributed among people and things. 
As cultures vary, so do the particular relations between of individuals, groups and 
objects in any particular culture. Although cognitive scientists often take into 
consideration technology alone and more specifically explicit cognitive technologies 
(such as computers or navigational devices) (e.g. Hutchins 1995; Dror and Harnad 
2008), cognitive processes are distributed also among other, less technically complex, 
things. If we bear in mind that, for human beings social orientation is as important as 
spatial orientation, we can consider, for instance, that mausolea, which simultaneously 
help us remember, mourn and know about social classes, are important navigational 
devices implied in social cognition. On the other hand, even from the point of view of 
spatial orientation we do not have to think extremely sophisticate machines: a broken 
branch that allows a hunter to find his way in the tropical forest is also a cognitive 
device. In this sense, Coman et al. (2009: 126) rightly consider that to understand the 
navigation of a blind person, a researcher must take into account the mechanisms of the 
brain and the nervous system on the finger tips, but also “the nature of the cane—its 
length, rigidity, graspability, and so on”. Objects, then, are also involved in our 
cognition in an unconscious way in daily practice. We think through things even when 
we do not think about them. In fact, as Martin Heiddegger (2002: 13-14) noted, it is 
precisely when we do not think about things that the thingness of the thing is working 
best: 
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“The equipmentality of equipment consists in its utilit. But what 
about this utility itself? In understanding it do we already understand 
the equipmentality of equipment? In order for this to be so, must we 
not look out for the useful piece of equipment in its use? The peasant 
woman wears her shoes in the field. Only then do they become what 
they are. They are all the more genuinely so the less the peasant 
woman thinks of her shoes while she is working, or even looks at 
them, or is aware of them in any way at all. This is how the shoes 
actually serve. It must be in this process of usage that the 
equipmentality of equipment actually confronts us”. 
  
The cognitive role of common artifacts is even more important in those societies that 
have not other means of transmitting information and preserving memory apart from 
oral communication (Kus and Raharijaona 1990: 23).   
 As the example of the cane of a blind person shows, things are not something 
that merely interacts with our minds and bodies. Material culture is an inherent part 
of ourselves, of our own physical existence. Consider bodily ornaments, clothing, body 
modifications, hairstyles, but also glasses, microscopes or audiphones, who have 
become part of ourselves as sensory prostheses (Witmore 2006: 281). It is not only our 
mind that is extended through things (Clark and Chalmers 1998), but our entire body. 
We are material culture (Webmoor and Witmore 2008) or, as Donna Haraway (1991: 
149-181) argues, cyborgs, “hybrids of machine and organism”, a mixture of technology 
and biology that blurs the distinction between nature and culture. This is not just the 
case of postmodern humans, but of every hominid since at least 2.5 million of years ago, 
when the first stone tools were made (Knappett 2002: 98).  
 We are material beings immersed in a material world. We may say that we 
are thrown (Heidegger’s Geworfenheit) into a material world, or even better, as Tim 
Ingold (2009: 5) eloquently puts it, we live “in the throwing”, as this is better described 
as a fluid process. The world, then, is not just a blank, neutral scenario for human 
dramas to unfold, a source of problem-specifying inputs (Clark 2008: 16) or something 
to be fashioned by thoughts which emerge in a separate sphere of mental activity 
(Thomas 1998: 155). It is something deeply enmeshed in our lives. The active 
materiality of the world is fundamental for understanding human beings: as Ernst 
Boesch (1991: 334) has eloquently remarked: 
 “it is the permanence of things that provide individuals with a cadre 
permitting the building of over-situative action structures. Thereby, they 
provide the conditions for those constancies in I-world-relationships without 
which the construction of identity would be difficult to conceive”.  
 We cooperate actively in the making of the material world that surrounds us, but 
making things makes ourselves simultaneously. A potter is constituted through her 
making pots, a basket maker through his making baskets. Making things affects 
sensorimotor skills (Boesch 1993; Roux et al. 1995; Crown 2001; Stout 2002) and, 
more importantly, perceptions of oneself, society and the world, as the teaching of 
technical processes incorporates social information and attitudes that are not strictly 
oriented to technical ends (Dobres 2000; Wallaert-Pêtre 2001). 
 Yet making artifacts is only part of the constitution of the self in relation to 
materiality. Subjects are made through the use of things as well (Miller 1987), 
especially in those cultures where handicrafts have vanished and technological 
knowledge is socially very restricted—for example, in industrial and post-industrial 
societies. In the modern world, we construct our subjectivities through the consumption 
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of fashion (Boesch 1991: 321-324; Roche 1996), homes (Miller 2001a), vehicles (Miller 
2001b), food, art, and many other things. Furthermore, the way we abandon and destroy 
material culture is also part and parcel of our identity (e.g. Marcoux 2001). Although 
destruction might be particularly characteristic of the modern world, it has always 
played a role in culture. The first agricultural communities of the Balkans destroyed 
their houses purposefully after a certain period, in what was in all probability a ritual 
cycle (Stevanovic 1997, see below). The Malanggan of New Ireland (Küchler 2002, see 
below) leave their elaborate funerary carvings to be slowly destroyed by the elements 
(as opposed to our emphasis on monumental preservation). This is related to 
conceptions of death, for sure, but also to a peculiar experience of what to be human is. 
It has been recently argued that different types of structural forgetting are specific to 
different social formations, and that late modernity is characterized by massive oblivion 
based on superhuman speed, megacities, consumerism, and perishable urban 
architecture (Connerton 2009). In the same vein, it can be said that late modern subjects 
cannot be understood without their intimate relationship with the continual and massive 
destruction of things and the environment (González-Ruibal 2008). One the defining 
characteristics of the 20th century has been the proliferation of artifacts purposefully 
designed to bring destruction on a large scale and aimed at civilians. The concept of the 
mass destruction of cities shaped a peculiar psychology in the industrialized world even 
before cities were actually destroyed by bombers. The abolition of time and space 
brought about by modernity created at the same time a hitherto unheard-of sensation of 
extreme vulnerability (everybody, everywhere can be annihilated), which was further 
spread by the nuclear menace of the Cold War (Escalona 1982).  
 In sum, it is the whole life cycle of things and people (from birth to death) that is 
ineluctably intertwined and this implies looking simultaneously at how people use (and 
discard) things, and how things use (and destroy) people. However, the relationship 
between consumption and destruction is more ambivalent than one may think. We have 
to bear in mind that the destruction of objects may turn out to be liberating: iconoclasm 
has often played a revolutionary role in the history of humankind. We only have to 
remember episodes such as Luddism (the destruction of machines by enraged workers 
in the early days of the Industrial Revolution), or the destruction of the Berlin Wall. 
Likewise, consumption can become alienating and create dependencies where there was 
none, a fact well known in situations of culture contact.  
 Material culture has agency. This is perhaps one of the most widely agreed 
tenets in current archaeology and material culture studies (Gell 1998; Olsen 2003; 
Gosden 2005; Knappet and Malafouris 2008), but also among psychologists: this is 
what “active externalism” is all about—the capacity of the environment to act upon us 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998: 8-12). We could even argue that culture at large has agency 
thanks to material culture. “Culture, reminds Valsiner (2007: 255), regulates action... It 
opens some possibilities for acting, thinking and feeling, while simultaneously closing 
others”. For its very physical nature, materiality is in a privileged position to regulate 
social and individual action. It promotes, inhibits or sets the pace of certain actions and 
operational sequences. A particular kind of key, for example, can force us to close a 
door in a way that no human actor ever could (Latour 2000). A pot with a handle forces 
us to hold it in a particular way and throwing a spear involves a different bodily gesture 
than using a bow and an arrow. A mosque imposes a bodily behavior and a mental 
attitude. Wearing a toga and wearing trousers preclude and allow different sets of 
actions and prescribe a different bodily hexis. In sum, objects impose on us the 
necessity that is inscribed in them (Boltanski 1990: 141). They order and orchestrate our 
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behavior and, in doing so, they play the role that Durkheim recognized to supra-
individual social norms inscribed in collective consciousness (ibid.).  
 Cognitive processes are not just distributed through people and things; they are 
also distributed through time (Cole and Engeström 1997: 19). Past actions and events 
can condition the future actions and events. Yet time is embedded in things and things 
have their own temporality, which does not have to coincide with human time (Olivier 
2008). Actually, the temporality of things is entangled with human temporalities in 
manifold and complex ways. Things are made in the past and conceived for the future: 
in this way, they abolish the radical divide between past, present and future (Witmore 
2006; González-Ruibal 2006a). For this reason, the material environment has an 
outstanding capacity to exert an influence in people, long time after their creators have 
passed away (Cole and Engeström 1997: 9). They continue to guide our actions and 
participate in our cognitive processes even when the original meanings of those artifacts 
have been deeply transformed—the plan of a Roman city, for example (Olivier 2008). 
Something of the deep and more abstract meaning of things, however, may still work in 
the present in an unconscious manner. The complex ways in which temporality is 
weaved into the fabric of past objects has attracted the attention of scholars outside the 
discipline. It is well known the case of Sigmund Freud in the realm of psychology, but 
many others have found inspiration in ruins: Walter Benjamin, Alois Riegl and Georg 
Simmel are three of the best-known examples of thinkers of ruination. It is the 
combination of a particular temporality with the blurring of nature and culture that has 
elicited more investigation (Simmel 1959: 260; see also Hetzler 1988). This 
simultaneous collapsing of nature and culture, present and past bewilders modernity, but 
not necessarily other rationalities and time perspectives, where this Cartesian 
boundaries are less clear (cf. Descola 2005). Meaningfully, the perception of ruins is 
tightly linked to notions of landscape that developed in northern Europe after the 16th 
century (cf. Simmel 2007). Our fascination with ruins speaks volumes, then, about the 
peculiarities of Western mind in more than one respect. The “fascination of patina” 
(Simmel 1959: 262), on the contrary, does not seem to be a Western prerogative, as 
Alain Schnapp (1996) has proved:  the ancient Chinese, for example, already showed a 
keen interest in the ruins of their ancestors and valued ancient artifacts for their 
historical and aesthetic qualities. Ancient bronze vessels from the Shang Dinasty (mid-
2nd millennium BC), achieved extraordinary prizes among collectors and antiquarians, 
centuries before Western-style archaeology arrived to China.. 
 Sometimes material culture carries codified symbolic information (Wobst 
1977; Schiffer 1999) and it is often designed to be communicative and representational 
(Hodder 1994: 395): the choice of clothes, for example, transmits information on ethnic 
(Wobst 1977) or social status (Hodder 1994: 395). Thus, we not only live immersed in a 
material world, but also in a material world that is full of, even saturated with, meaning. 
The advantage of material meanings is that they are always at work. They do not 
normally need to be activated to transmit information (like a myth that has to be told or 
a story that has to be read from a book). Following the Peirceian terminology (see 
Preucel [2006] for an archaeological take on the subject), we can say that material 
culture can be iconic, indexical or symbolic. A wedding ring is an example of a material 
symbol (Knappet 2002: 103-104) whose explicit meaning is conventional. Icons are 
another category of material signs that are clearly conceived to transmit coded 
information. Titus’ triumphal arch in the Roman Forum (FIGURE 1), for instance, is to 
be read as a commemoration of a specific military victory (the conquest of Jerusalem by 
the Roman army) and for that reason has a well-structured and accessible iconographic 
program that combines images with written text. Very often, artifacts carry at the same 
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time iconic and symbolic information: Titus’ arch does not just transmit an iconic 
message of military victory, it is also a metaphor (a symbol) of imperial power. And in 
some cases the indexical, symbolic and iconic are combined: consider the First World 
War memorials that incorporate actual elements from the war (such a rusty bomb shell), 
symbolic representations of the nation and iconic representations of soldiers.  
 
 However, most objects are not symbolic in the same way as a text: the 
relationship between material culture and meaning is seldom completely conventional 
and arbitrary. Unlike verbal symbols, material ones bear a direct material relation to 
their referents (Beach 1993). This is because most artifacts are actually better 
understood as indexes than as symbols (Knappet 2002: 104; Jones 2007: 19). An 
example of an index is the young breasts modeled in mud that the Gumuz women of 
Ethiopia use to decorate their granaries (FIGURE 2). There is a relation of contiguity, 
typical of indexes, between the breasts (representing human fertility) and the granary 
(representing the fertility of the fields). Furthermore, this indexicality brings the whole 
body into play, blurring the distinction between human and non-human materiality: by 
modeling breasts on mud, Gumuz girls are extending the surface of their bodies beyond 
their anatomic limits. As indexes, the meaning of material culture is not just produced 
by social convention, but also through pragmatic understandings of the material 
world—the relationship between the breasts and the fertility of the fields is based on a 
real connection between two reproductive processes.   
 This is related to another point: the relationship between material culture and 
practice (Hodder 1994: 396). Most of the time, material culture works through the 
evocation of sets of practices that are not discursively perceived and that, sometimes, 
cannot be put into words. A roof-tile is not meant to consciously represent anything, to 
convey any explicit meaning (as Titus’ triumphal arch or even the Gumuz granary).  But 
this does not mean that they are not meaningful. They are enmeshed in cultural practices 
and systems of meanings that involve other artifacts, ideas, memories, bodily gestures, 
speech acts and built spaces: a kitchen knife may not have any powerful symbolic 
meaning attached, yet the (culturally-mediated) associations it can bring to mind are 
many and varied. They are certainly not the same if the knife is in a kitchen, at an 
airport control, or flashing in a dark alley. As archaeologists insist, context is vital to 
understand things. Context and things together allow us to behave in practice. Material 
culture is therefore tightly related to practical knowledge that allows us to act in specific 
domains of action (Hodder 1994: 398). 
 Starting from the concept of material culture outlined above, I will address now 
four main concerns of archaeology and psychology where it is possible to see how the 
discipline of things can contribute to the project of cultural psychology: personhood, 
emotion, space and memory.   
(h1) SELF AND PERSONHOOD 
The last decade has witnessed an important debate in archaeology concerning the idea 
of personhood in prehistoric and historic times. For a long time, the issue of how 
persons are constituted as such was undertheorized in the discipline, as opposed to 
history and anthropology. The panorama started to change in the 1980s, with the import 
of postmodern interests in individual agency and identity, and by the 1990s many 
archaeologists were looking for individuals in the past (e.g. Meskell 1999). The post-
processual take on personhood came under severe criticism in the early 2000s due to 
their anachronistic nature. Critics point out that by trying to find individual agents in 
other cultures, the highly individualized late capitalist person is being projected onto 
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past societies, which are thus perceived as amalgamations of self-conscious individuals 
endowed with fluid and changeable identities in constant negotiation (Casella and 
Fowler 2005). The interest in particular individual lives came along with the 
introduction of the postmodern politics of identity (age, class, race, gender, sex, 
nationality, ethnicity) in the discipline, that further fragmented prehistoric and historic 
identities along postmodern lines (Díaz-Andreu et al. 2005). Although post-processual 
archaeology has been relevant in expanding the research agenda and in pointing out the 
relevance of identity and personhood, the approach has resulted in a transformation of 
all past societies into a sort of distorted mirror image of our own late modern existences.  
 Archaeologists like Felipe Criado (2001) and Almudena Hernando (2002) were 
among the first to call for a more critical exploration of selfhood in the past, drawing 
upon anthropological and historical theory. They emphasized the collective and 
relational nature of prehistoric concepts of personhood, and idea that was later 
independently developed in the Anglo-Saxon archaeological tradition (Fowler 2004). 
British archaeologists relied on Melanesist anthropology and particularly in the work of 
Marilyn Strathern (1988) to support their perspectives on prehistoric personhood. 
Strathern contends that the Melanesian person is not individual, but “dividual”, multiply 
constituted through relations with other persons. Besides being dividual, members of 
Melanesian societies are also partible. They are composed of different substances that 
are inherited from the parents or acquired through kinship and affinal relations. In 
certain contexts, such as marriage, ceremonial exchanges and death, persons can be 
decomposed: they give away parts of their selves in the guise of pigs and other 
valuables. But the bodies themselves are conceived as decomposable, too: people can 
detach from parts of their own bodies as well as attach to themselves parts (or 
substances) of other peoples’ bodies. Relational identities have also been described as 
fractal and permeable (Fowler 2004), as opposed to the bounded and indivisible self of 
modernity. Currently, there is a widespread belief in archaeology that self-identity is 
either relational (most prehistoric societies), and suspiciously similar to the Melanesian 
self depicted by Strathern, or individual and well-bound (historical and, especially, 
modern Western societies). This dual schema reminds the independent/interdependent 
distinction proposed by Markus and Kitayama (1991) and is sometimes perceived in too 
radical terms. LiPuma (1998) considers that we have to take into account elements of 
individuality in the construction of the self among non-modern societies and, likewise, 
elements of relationality (or dividuality) in societies with highly individualized persons. 
For Hernando (2008: 68), both relational and individual identities have at least one 
thing in common: they are both fantasies, creations of the human mind whose aim is to 
neutralize the anxiety that would cause the true understanding of the powerlessness that 
defines our relation to the world. And what could be better to give an appearance of 
solidity to a fantasy than material culture?   
 Materiality is deeply involved in the construction of both relational and 
individual selves. Societies where relational forms of identity prevail tend to produce 
homogeneous objects and styles that underscore the shared identity and relations 
between members of the society, whereas individualistic societies normally produce a 
proliferation of distinct artifacts and categories of artifacts in order to satisfy a myriad of 
tastes that are enmeshed in complex social strategies (Bourdieu 1984). Nevertheless, 
even in collective cultures there are people that tend to develop more individuality than 
others. Ritual specialists in segmentary societies, for instance, tend to use a very 
peculiar material culture and wear extravagant clothes and adornments (Devlet 2001). 
We have to understand this not just as a mere symbol of status or a materialization of 
mythologies, but also as an index of the more individualized self of the ritual specialists, 
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which leads them to channel their need for differentiation through the use of artifacts. 
Actually, following a symmetrical approach, we could say that extraordinary objects 
and apparel are indistinguishable from the ritual specialist’s self: the shaman or diviner 
is a very particular cyborg within a society of more homogenous cyborgs. Similarly, 
even in highly individualized societies, there are material elements that reinforce the ties 
between different members of the community and for this reason have a very important 
psychological role. In the case of late modern Western society, we can see this in the 
urban tribes that resort to the same clothing and items to create a sense of belonging 
among their members.   
(h2) RELATIONAL IDENTITIES 
 Relational identities were prevalent in the world at least until the 16th century 
AD. It was probably not before the 20th century that the individual self has come to 
dominate globally. Relational identities are characterized by a series of material markers, 
some of which explicitly encode information about the identity of a particular 
community, whereas others are of a rather unconscious nature. Among those objects 
that explicitly encode social information, we may consider bows and arrows (Wiessner 
1982; Pétrequin and Pétrequin 1990). In many cultures, arrows have an assertive 
character, that is, they express personal identity, craftsmanship and taste. However, they 
also convey, in a very explicit way, information about the identity of the group to which 
the person who made the arrows belongs. Thus, the Ye-Ineri, an ethnic group from Irian 
Jaya (New Guinea), make different arrows depending on age, function of the arrow (war 
or hunting) and personal ability. However, it is still possible to distinguish easily a 
bundle of arrows from the Ye-Ineri group and a bundle of arrows from the Tangma 
community. Whereas in a society where independent selves prevail there are scarce 
limits to personal innovation, among the Ye-Ineri and Tangma, despite an apparent 
liberty, the limits are very well demarcated. The boundaries for personal creativity are 
enforced in daily practice, through moral sanctions and social disapproval that do not 
necessarily imply explicit verbal condemnation. A way of curtailing personal creativity 
in a society of interdependent self is not buying, exchanging or accepting in ritualized 
occasions (or accepting grudgingly) those artifacts that clearly deviate from the norm.  
   Some artifacts and technical knowledge in societies of interdependent self are 
so crucial in promoting identity that they can be considered technologies of the self, 
following Michel Foucault (1988), but instead of an individual self, what they help 
create is a collective one. Unlike items that bear explicit ethnic information (such as 
bows and arrows), technologies of the collective self are often unconscious or, at least, 
beyond verbal discourse. A good example is the technology of food consumption. This 
technology includes artifacts, body techniques, and operational sequences. Changes to 
the technology of food consumption often implies dramatic transformations in society 
and identity: James Deetz (1996: 86-87) has equated the evolution from communal 
vessels to individual dishes in North America during the 17th and 18th century and the 
evolution of independent selves from collective ones—a phenomenon that has its 
correlates in the organization of domestic space and refuse disposal. The relevance of 
the technologies of food consumption for shaping a collective self is clearly visible 
among many Sub-Saharan communities. The case of the Komo is telling. They are a 
highly egalitarian small-scale society of slash-and-burn agriculturalists, who live in 
villages of less than two hundred inhabitants in the Sudanese-Ethiopian borderland 
(Theis 1995). As in other neighboring groups (James 1988), community values are 
continuously enforced in daily life. One of the mechanisms for buttressing a communal 
identity is the working party: a family calls relatives and neighbors to lend a hand with 
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the harvest or the building of a hut and, in compensation, provide food and beer. The 
artifacts and the body gestures employed in these rituals are essential for the 
perpetuation of relational selves (FIGURE 3): everybody forms a circle and drinks from 
the same big pot using straws, giving their backs to the outer world and their faces to 
neighbors and relatives (González-Ruibal et al. 2009: 60). A sense of solidarity is 
extraordinarily reinforced in this way.   
 Relational identities are also expressed in the way the dead are treated. It seems 
logical that if persons are considered partible and decomposable, their bodies are too 
(Jones 2005). Burials from Europe and the Near East during the Mesolithic (that is, the 
period of the last hunter-gatherers before the emergence of agriculture in the Old World) 
often keep only disarticulated bones (Verjux 2007), because the human remains were 
buried after a period of exposure to the elements or because the bones were dug up and 
reburied again. These practices continued with the first agrarian communities in the 
period known as Neolithic (Thomas 2000). Some egalitarian societies still practice, or 
practiced until recently, secondary burials. That is the case of the Uduk of Sudan (James 
1988), who used to dig out one or more of the bones of a recent tomb, anoint them with 
red ochre and return them to the grave, a ceremony that was meaningfully called 
“Settling the Grave” (James 1988: 131). The idea was to make sure that the spirit could 
make a complete and clean break from the body (ibid: 127). The skull, in particular, 
tends to receive a differential treatment in many cultures. Modified and decorated skulls 
abounded during the late Mesolithic period in the Levant (Kuijt 1996) and this practice 
in well known from ethnographic contexts in areas like Melanesia (Zegwaard 1959). Ian 
Kuijt (1996) interprets skull removal and other mortuary practices (such as lack of grave 
goods) in the Near East as part of the strategies developed by complex hunter-gatherers 
and incipient agriculturalists to limit the accumulation of power and authority.  
 As people are perceived as inseparable from the collective in relational cultures, 
tombs are often collective. The skeletons of different people appear mingled together 
and sometimes it is difficult to refit individual bodies (Fowler 2001). Sometimes, even 
animal bones appear mixed with human remains: this probably means the relational self 
included relations with non-humans as well (Descola 2005). The treatment of the 
deceased was a very straightforward way of transmitting ideas of the self and 
community in the broad sense. There seems to be a tendency among those societies 
where corpses and bones are manipulated not to hide away the event of death, as 
opposed to societies with only one death ritual. In fact, many of the rituals of 
excarnation, dismemberment, burial and reburial of bones were attended by the entire 
group and sometimes parts of the dead were ritually consumed (Conklin 1995; 
Boulestin 2009), which is the most powerful way of showing a sense of community.  
 
(h2) INDIVIDUAL IDENTITIES 
 The strong development of individuality in the West since the 15th century 
comes hand in hand with an extraordinary increase in the number and variety of artifacts 
through which new, diverse and often conflictual selves were channeled and constituted: 
gardens (Leone 1984), houses and headstones (Deetz 1996), portraits (Burke 1995), and 
even toothpicks (MacLean 2009). Some of these items are used in a communicative 
manner, to consciously display personal and social taste and status—that is, as symbols: 
clothes, silver or chinaware (Goodwin 1999; Schneider 2006: 206-207). In other cases, 
things become intrinsically related with the self in an unconscious manner—this is the 
case of toothbrushes and other items of personal hygiene and bodily care (Gaitán 2005), 
as well as writing and reading materials (Hall 2000: 80-83). Both categories of artifacts 
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are related in that they have to do with ideas of care (physical or psychical) and they are 
therefore crucial in fostering and cultivating the individual self. In this sense, they are 
technologies of the self (Foucault 1988; Fowler 2004: 13), but also “core objects”, as 
Boesch (1991: 333) has called them: “one which, by its usages and ritual connectedness, 
appears to be vital for the definition of a culture”. A particular technology of the self 
that develops since the mid-16th century in the context of the Counter-Reformation is 
the material culture of bodily discipline. Whips, sticks, cingula and cilices (Brandão and 
Nassaney 2008) were aimed at purifying the self by mortifying the sinful body. 
Although cilices were used since Antiquity, their success in early modernity has to be 
related to the progressive imposition of dualistic ideas that created a divide between 
mind and body—the first being equated with the self (and soul)—and the increasing 
importance of the individual person and individual salvation.  
 It would be wrong, though, to think that technologies of the individual self exist 
only in modernity or in evolved state societies—such as the Greek and Roman world 
examined by Foucault (1988). Technologies of bodily care that evince a strong 
awareness of the individual self developed since the mid-2nd millennium BC in Bronze 
Age Europe, when razors and mirrors, dress pins and individualized weaponry became 
widespread among elites (Treherne 1995). Those items were indispensable to constitute 
individual selves in the midst of rather homogeneous communities. 
 The difference with modernity is that technologies of the self and individualized 
material culture become extremely generalized, eventually cutting across social classes, 
race and gender. In our globalized, late capitalist world, almost everybody wants to be 
unique. In fact, artifacts in modernity can be a powerful way of holding the self together 
in disruptive scenarios, such as civil conflicts, wars and dictatorships. Artifacts may 
help to link one with his or her self prior to the traumatic experience (for example, the 
handicrafts made by prisoners) (López Mazz 2009: 39-41) or to create a new self, which 
incorporates (and domesticates) the traumatic experience. This is the case of trench art, 
the artifacts produced by soldiers in World War I (Saunders 2009). 
 To summarize, material culture is fundamental in constituting the self as 
relational or independent—and the whole spectrum between one possibility and the 
other. A child belonging to a small-scale, egalitarian community will arrive to a 
homogenous world in which all artifacts look the same and private possessions are 
minimal: he will associate himself with sameness rather than difference. Through those 
artifacts (houses, pots or cultivated fields), the child will learn to live in a society where 
relations among humans and non-humans are more important than individual persons. 
Furthermore, as the child grows, he will progressively use technologies of the collective 
self, that is, techniques, technical knowledge and artifacts that make him relate to others 
and that would constitute his psychical existence as part of a communal body: for 
instance, weapons and strategies used in communal hunting or spindles and songs in 
communal weaving ceremonies. In some cases, such as in many societies of hunter-
gatherers, private possessions are reduced to almost nil. Everything has to be given 
away if someone asks for it (and vice versa: one is allowed to use almost everything 
from everybody). The boy who is born in a community of relational self will never see 
or make an iconic representation of himself, only idealized representations of Men, 
Women, Ancestors, Gods and everything in-between. By attending funerals where 
bodies are manipulated, carved up, buried, dug up and reburied, he will learn to perceive 
his body as plastic and decomposable, a continuum in the mass of human and animal 
bodies that populate the world.  
 If we consider now a girl born in a late modern highly individualistic society, we 
will see her exposed from her birth to a highly differentiated material world. She will 
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learn to understand social and group differences through artifacts, but she will also 
become aware of her own uniqueness as an individual through the use of particular 
objects and through the consumption choices that she will be compelled to make 
(Baudrillard 1968: 196-197): toys, clothes, books, cars, DVDs, web-blogs. From her 
earliest childhood, she will recognize herself in photographs. She will learn that her self 
is modifiable but not decomposable, both in its physicality, in its social attachments and 
in its psychic qualities. She will read self-help books or philosophy, sculpt her body in 
the gym or operate her breasts. Yet there is a limit to what an individual can become 
even in modern societies: prisons, reform schools and asylums are institutions that 
model the deviated self through all kind of material and immaterial tools (Foucault 1975; 
Casella 2007), which, again, are aimed at the individual person—individual cells, 
solitary confinement cells, psychological assistance.  
(h1) EMOTION AND MATERIAL CULTURE 
Emotional experience is universal, but emotions are culturally variable, as 
anthropologists have abundantly demonstrated (Lutz and White 1986; Tarlow 2000a): 
cultural meanings, experiences and values attached to emotions vary from society to 
society. According to Richard Shweder (1991: 242),  
“To understand the emotional life of a person is to understand the types 
of feelings (anger, envy, fear, depersonalization, shame, joy, love, 
homesickness, and so on) felt by that person, the distribution and 
frequency of those feelings across time and context, the kind of 
situations that elicit them, the wishes and fantasies that occur with them 
and the action tendencies set off by them”.  
What can be the contribution of archaeology to understand the emotional life of 
individuals and societies? We have to take into account that emotions are not always 
easily verbalized, especially overwhelming emotions—what Valsiner (2007: 312) calls 
“hyper-abstracted and over-generalized higher level total feelings”. Actually, feelings 
themselves cannot be observed, only indexes of it (gestures, facial movements, 
heartbeats (Shweder 1991: 242) and indexes are the raw material with which 
archaeologists work. Besides, emotions are often triggered, oriented or conditioned by 
the material world (Valsiner 2008).  
 Emotion has figured prominently in recent archaeological debates (Tarlow 
2000a). The basic problem is how can we actually know what other peoples experienced 
in the past? Unlike ethnographers, archaeologists rarely have the opportunity of an 
intersubjective experience—or “subjective pilgrimage”, as Valsiner (2007: 311) aptly 
puts it—with living people. In the case of historical archaeology, this can be somehow 
mitigated through the use of texts (including personal diaries and letters). For illiterate 
societies, the problem we face might be deemed insurmountable. We are forced to make 
inferences based on analogies with similar societies documented ethnographically as 
well as on our own subjective experience. The latter has been the object of much 
discussion. Since Christopher Tilley’s seminal book A Phenomenology of Landscape 
(1994), the philosophical insights of phenomenology have been widely applied to 
prehistoric archaeology, especially in the British Isles (Brück 2005). Interest in past 
feelings has led in some cases to subjective excesses and to a trivialization of 
phenomenological theory (cf. critique in Olsen 2006). However, most archaeologists 
have avoided both the most objectivist and the most subjectivist positions, adopting 
nuanced perspectives. Therefore, there are those who, from a relativistic and 
constructivist stance, stress the enormous difficulty of approaching subjective 
experiences of people belonging to other cultures (Tarlow 2000a; Brück 2005), even if 
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basic human similarities across cultures are acknowledged. On the other hand, there are 
those who emphasize our ability to connect with past senses of place through our own 
bodily experience (Tilley 1994), although they accept that specific meanings and precise 
feelings mostly escape the archaeologist.   
 Admittedly, access to particular emotions of other cultures from material 
remains alone is extremely difficult and always requires some sort of cultural translation. 
There is no true immediate experience of the past: in the case of prehistoric societies, 
we are dealing with people who had a wholly different cosmology and rationality, 
which deeply shaped their perceptions of the world (Thomas 2004: 216-217; Brück 
2005: 54-55). Nevertheless, we can still have some access to past emotions without 
resorting to texts. On the one hand, the work of cultural psychologists has proved that 
most basic emotions (such as anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise) 
appear in most cultures, although they are expressed in very different ways (Heine 
2010). After all, there is a shared biological basis that explains human emotion. On the 
other hand, the physical engagement of the human body with the material world is 
central to experience and the materiality of the body offers some possibilities of 
experience and precludes others (Tilley 1994). Thus, cold, heath, hunger or pain—
although conceived in different ways and endured to different degrees by different 
cultures—affect all human bodies and these have limits as to what they can see and 
interact with from a certain topographical position. Also, the materiality of the 
landscape itself has not changed much in many cases: the physical environment 
interacts with physical human bodies in specific ways, irrespective of culture (Tilley 
2004).   
 The important point to bear in mind is that the emotions archaeologists are better 
able to retrieve are those related to hyper-abstracted and over-generalized feelings—the 
kind of feelings one has when entering a gothic cathedral, a megalithic tomb or a prison 
cell. Instead of trying to discern in detail particular emotions, archaeologists are at their 
best when they explore the material mechanisms that trigger those emotions in different 
cultural contexts. In which places was greater the investment made in material devices 
oriented towards affection? Which spaces were more emotionally charged? Those 
related to collective identity, political power, religion, punishment, individual 
achievement, life, death, liminal states? Which spaces display more varied devices for 
triggering sentiment?   
 If a place is emotionally invested to a high degree, it can help us know the 
importance of such place in society, as well as the activities related to that place: for 
example: tombs of children in the West are often overcharged with indexes of affection. 
It is difficult not to feel moved by some of these tombs displaying a variety of toys, 
teddy bears, letters, photographs and flowers. This is because children are not supposed 
to die in an industrialized society, but also because childhood has been marked as a 
well-defined and valuable period of human life mostly in modernity (Ariès 1987). On 
the contrary, in many preindustrial societies children tombs are very inconspicuous and 
in some prehistoric cultures they were not even buried at all (Scott 1999). However, 
prehistoric or ancient societies should not all necessarily show the same kind of 
emotional behavior, although some tendencies applied: in her study of the Egyptian 
village of Deir el-Medina (late 2nd millennium BC), Lynn Meskell (1999) proposed that 
the death of children was experienced as a painful event, based on the elaborated burials 
of non-aristocratic children and contemporary texts.  
 
H3) EMOTIONAL FRAMING OF POLITICAL LIVES 
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 Another case has to do with elements of affection in political life. Political 
celebrations tend to mobilize different kinds of emotions: power is sensuous and 
corporeal, and not just in premodern societies (Kus 1989; Mbembe 2000; Linke 2006). 
As Tarlow (2000a: 719) reminds  
 
“Hegemony and authority in social contexts are constituted through such 
emotional experiences as awe, respect, fear, shame, and guilt, as well as 
familiarity and security”.  ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY YOU DO NOT 
NEED TO INDENT QUOTES LIKE THAT, I STILL RECOMMEND IT 
SO AS TO CAPTURE THE READER’S GAZE ON CRUCIAL POINTS 
 
These emotional experiences are framed by material apparatuses. However, emotion in 
political contexts varies wildly from culture to culture. To use two opposite examples: 
Versailles was devised so as to arouse overwhelming feelings of superhuman grandeur, 
a fact that fits well with a divine conception of power. The place which is known by its 
address—10 Downing Street—on the contrary, is completely bereft of material devices 
to trigger emotion—although these may arise for different motivations. This speaks 
volumes about the conception of power in contemporary liberal democratic societies.  
(h2) DEATH AND EMOTION: NEOLITHIC EUROPE AND THE MODERN WEST 
Understanding emotion in context, then, helps us to understand culture. In what follows, 
we will look at a place loaded with emotion—cemeteries—in two different cultural 
environments: Neolithic Western Europe and Euro-American modernity.  
 
(h3) NEOLITHIC EUROPE 
 Megalithic tombs were built all over Western Europe by early farmers during the 
period known as Neolithic, that is, between the early fifth and early third millennium 
BC. They were the first monumental, collective tombs—the first monuments at all—in 
most places where they were built (FIGURE 4). During the second millennium BC 
monumental burials still existed in different places of Europe, such as southern Britain 
and southern Portugal, but they were erected for individual persons or particular 
powerful families. Megalithic tombs soon developed into a very complex architecture 
with immense possibilities to shape and direct emotion. Subtle changes in temperature, 
texture, darkness and light, sound and visibility configured very particular experiences 
of community, death, afterlife, and the sacred. Also, the tomb itself was not the only 
important element for framing social experiences. Tombs were inserted in meaningful 
landscapes in which other monuments and natural features interacted to create a sense 
of place (Tilley 1994). During the last decade, there have been many attempts to avoid 
intuitive approaches to Neolithic emotions. Archaeologists try to provide contrasted 
accounts of the ways in which “hyper-abstracted and over-generalized feelings” where 
fostered and enhanced inside tombs and in megalithic landscapes. Regarding landscape, 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) have been used to recover the way it was 
experienced in the past in a more objective manner (e.g. Criado and Villoch 2000; 
Llobera 2003; Wallace 2007). GIS analyses allow making visible connections, which 
are unknown or known intuitively, between different monuments and natural features.  
 Megalithic tombs were open monuments, in which rituals took place and where 
corpses were being buried, exhumed and reburied in a regular basis. They are excellent 
examples of “scripted dramatic everyday life situations” (Valsiner 2007: 250) which are 
crucial in the psychological development of human beings. Overwhelming feelings 
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were achieved through different means: one of them is the art that covers part of the 
huge stones (FIGURE 5). Unlike in the modern world, art was not a normal occurrence 
in the Neolithic. People did not live in an “ornamented world” (Valsiner 2008) as we do. 
Thus, entering a profusely engraved tomb must have certainly been regarded as a 
liminal event, an entrance into another world—and it is precisely entrances and 
passages that are most often decorated (Bradley 1989). Sensations were probably 
enhanced, at least in some cases, with the use of consciousness-altering substances, 
which interacted with the images to foster hallucinations and visions (Dronfield 1995a, 
1995b). The images—spirals, lozenges, arcs, meanders and curves—are thought to be 
inspired in the visions themselves. Dronfield (1995b: 547) proved that Irish passage-
tomb art is fundamentally “similar to (as opposed to merely resembling) arts derived 
from endogenous subjective vision”.  
 However, it is not strictly necessary to consider the use of drugs to explain the 
way the mind was altered inside the tomb. Songs, sounds, dancing, speech and 
movement could have been used to provoke an altered state of mind. The issue of sound 
has received significant attention. Watson and Keating (1999), for instance, analyzed 
the particular sounds of a stone circle (a sort of sanctuary or shrine) and a passage way-
type megalithic tomb. The authors of the research discovered that a single drum was 
capable of generating approximately 4 to 5 Hz at between 120 and 130 decibels inside a 
megalithic tomb, a level of exposure that could result in balance disturbance, pressure 
on the ears, speaking difficulties, vibration, drowsiness and headaches. Also involved in 
enhancing experience and creating meaning was texture, that involved touching and 
therefore a bodily experience of the monument (Cummings 2002). In this context, it is 
worth remembering, with Warnier (2006: 187) the basic role of the skin in the 
ontogenesis of the human subject: “The psyche is constructed as an envelope by 
‘anaclisis’ on the anatomical-physiological functions of the skin”. Here, anaclisis is 
understood as related to a process by which psychic experiences build upon—or are 
propped against—bodily motions and emotions. Differences between smooth and rough 
surfaces in megaliths could have triggered different emotional responses and be imbued 
with different meanings. Finally, the textures of light must have been very important in 
the megalithic experience. Light is manipulated in many architectural traditions to orient 
emotional responses (Bille and Sorensen 2007). Although similar effects to those of 
megaliths could have been previously achieved in natural spaces, such as caves, by 
hunter-gatherers (Reznikoff and Dauvois 1988; Waller 1993), the difference is that 
megaliths were the first explicit attempt at creating and manipulating sensory conditions 
to affect the subject in an artificial way.   
  The relevance of megalithic tombs in the social lives of early agriculturalists 
should not be underestimated. As I have pointed out, these were regular arenas for 
social interaction (much more than modern cemeteries). The term “tomb” is misleading 
for us, as we divide the world of the death and that of the living in a very clear-cut way, 
and try to avoid any contact with the former. In addition, the megaliths were probably 
used, if not by the whole community, at least by a large part of it, including children and 
adolescents. Although the most secluded parts of the tomb could have been accessed 
only by a few, the ceremonies in the necropolises were attended in all likelihood by the 
entire group. Watson and Keating (1999) proved that sounds made inside a megalithic 
tomb could be heard outside, emerging from the passage entrance. Megaliths, then, were 
an essential element in the emotional economy of the early European farmers. The 
rituals carried out inside and around the tombs were emotionally intense and involved 
the whole community: actually, they helped reinforce the sense of community—and 
communitas (Turner 2002). The sensorial qualities of the megaliths enhanced the 
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experience, and channeled and amplified the emotions. The relation with the deceased 
and with the ancestors was very close: one literally entered the house of the dead and 
manipulated the bones of one’s relatives.  
 
(h3) THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD  
  Quite the opposite is the case of modern cemeteries. Despite cycles of 
ostentation and restrain in funerary ceremonies, the general trend in European and North 
American funerals during the 19th and 20th century has been towards the restriction of 
emotions. For the last hundred years, ostentation in tombs and funerals has been 
regarded in most Western societies as a sign of bad taste and low or marginal status 
(Cannon 1994: 440; Parker-Pearson 1982: 104-107). This process has been explained 
on economic and social grounds—investments in status markers changing from 
funerary display to other realms to maintain class distinctions. However, there seems to 
be deeper reasons for this general trend towards more sober cemeteries and rituals: it 
seems that an excess of materiality in funerary ceremonies and tombs was 
unconsciously equated with an excess of emotion. And with good reasons: as we saw in 
the case of megaliths, a redundant, saturated material environment was fundamental in 
triggering and amplifying emotions.  
  One of the main differences between modern and pre-modern cemeteries is the 
prevalence of visual experience and visual codes in the former, in line with the 
enormous importance conferred to the sense of vision in modernity (Levin 1993). 
Although hearing still plays a role (choirs, sermons, reading of religious texts), bodily 
senses are less prominent than in non-modern communities. Tombs are not designed to 
be touched (much less corpses) or to have a particular sound—and human remains do 
not smell. The experience of death is sober, clean, individual and introspective. The 
suburban cemeteries that spread through northern Europe from the late 18th century 
onwards and particularly the Anglo-American garden cemetery (Tarlow 2000b) played 
a prominent role in shaping the emotions of death as individually experienced. Garden 
cemeteries were located in pastoral, suburban locations. This was justified on hygienic 
grounds, but in fact, it was not only physical dirt and pollution that preoccupied urban 
reformers, but also the moral and emotional cleanliness that the new cemeteries brought 
with them (Tarlow 2000b: 227). The isolated tombs and the manicured landscaped had 
a double effect (FIGURE 6): on the one hand, they calmed down and sifted emotions, 
fostered introspection and enabled self-reflective attitudes (just the opposite of 
emotionally-loaded, collective megaliths). On the other hand, they permitted to 
experience emotions (even the more violent ones that one could not restrain) without 
being seen by many people, a situation of relative intimacy that could hardly be 
achieved in overcrowded city churchyards.     
 Although similar trends toward suburban, hygienic cemeteries existed in 
southern Europe from the mid-18th century (Calatrava 1991), there are important 
national differences. Anglo-Saxon cemeteries are much more individual-oriented than 
Mediterranean ones. In the United Kingdom, the United States and other places with a 
strong protestant tradition, tombs are individual and situated wide apart in vast 
cemeteries. On the contrary, in Spain and other Mediterranean countries, tombs are 
often cramped together around churches, often in multi-niche structures (Tarlow 2000b: 
222)—a translation to the material world of a more relational identity within a culture of 
the individual self (FIGURE 7). Anglo-Saxon cemeteries are spaces for melancholic, 
individual feelings. Mediterranean necropolises are more appropriate for open, 
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collective emotions and expressions of family and neighborhood solidarity. According 
to Tarlow (2000b: 224),  
“An appreciation of Protestant virtues of simplicity and nature was a central 
part of British identity in the nineteenth century. In their own 
understandings, the Protestant nations were distinguished from their 
overblown Catholic neighbours by an authenticity of unmediated, pure 
moral feeling”.  
This, however, the more interdependent Catholics would interpret as aloofness and 
individualistic behavior.  
 Finally, another element that can be enlightening as to the relation between self, 
emotion and death in societies of independent self is the issue of memorials. In modern 
cemeteries, it is the performative act of reading the name of the deceased on a 
tombstone—an individual act—that provokes the most powerful feelings. Significantly, 
one of the most successful war memorials ever built is the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
in Washington DC (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991), in which reading is absolutely 
essential for unleashing intense feelings. Its success lies in two facts: it commemorates 
individual lives (the entire monument is a list of names) and it abolishes the difference 
between past and present (by uttering the name of the dead, people are able to evoke a 
strong sense of presence). This fits better the modern self than collective, abstract 
memorials, as those built after the First World War. Whereas in the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial the focus is on the individual, in First World War memorials the focus is on 
collective sacrifice (Winter 1995: 78-116). Unlike other monuments, and due to the 
controversial and divisive character of the war, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was 
actually explicitly designed so as to avoid collective messages and to evoke instead 
“‘feelings, thoughts, and emotions’ of a variant and private nature” (Wagner-Pacifici 
and Schwartz 1991: 393). In short, the Washington memorial can be considered the 
quintessential monument to the dead in highly individualized late modern societies. 
However, what the memorial achieves in the short term, it loses in the longuée duré, a 
fact that is also eloquent of modern identity: after a few generations, it will fail to 
trigger intense emotions, when the names of the individual dead fall into oblivion 
(Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991: 417-418). This is in opposition to the megalithic 
chambers: the bones of the remotest ancestors and the newcomers to the tomb were 
mingled together. Every ceremony held in the megalith was an intense, emotional 
experience. Individuals did not matter: it was the always-regenerated, cyclical self of the 
community that mattered. The Vietnam War Memorial will fail to evoke presence in 
less than a century. The megaliths evoked it for millennia.  
(h1)  SPACE AND ORDER 
The agency of material culture as a framework over our actions is nowhere more 
obvious than in the built environment (Parker Pearson and Richards 1994): it orients 
everyday life by offering certain spaces for programmed action, while closing other 
possibilities (Dovey 1999: 11). Walls, rooms, doors and decorations act as “semiotic 
blockers” (Valsiner 2007: 68) that regulate the semiotic hierarchies of the dialogical self. 
The agency of buildings is clearly seen, for example, when we enter a library and 
immediately start to speak in a low voice (Donley-Reid 1990: 116). It is not only the 
verbal messages (signs of “Silence” or the librarian’s command) that make us lower the 
volume of our voice. It is the material environment as a whole that is forcing us to adopt 
a certain attitude: the quality of light, the books, the curtains and shelves, the texture of 
the walls and floors. Houses, in particular, are a critical element in every culture and are 
endowed with an especially powerful agency. They intimately shape our behavior and 
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experience of the world since our childhood; they give us ontological security by 
creating predictability and routinization (Giddens 1984); they replicate the cosmos 
(Preston Blier 1987); help us know our place in society (Donley-Reid 1987), and guide 
affection (Bachelard 1964). They even shape our bodily memory: “The house where we 
are born, writes Bachelard (1964: 32), is physically inscribed in us. It is a group of 
organic habits”. Another important consequence, in psychological terms, of the built 
environment, is its capacity to affect our modes of spatial reasoning. It seems obvious 
that the perception of space cannot be the same among a group of slash-and-burn 
agriculturalists who live in single-celled huts separated wide apart and among people 
living in square, multi-roomed houses in a cramped city. Susan Kent (1990) has 
demonstrated that structures become more segmented as social organization becomes 
more complex and hierarchical. Segmentation of the space increases in parallel to 
conceptions of intimacy, individualism, political power, religion, and, more generally, 
with the development of modes of rationality that tend to fragment, divide and sort out 
the world in specific categories. All these transformations in space and the self are 
particularly visible in modernity (Deetz 1996). 
 I will review here two cases that exemplify well how domestic space is deeply 
inscribed in persons’ minds and bodies: the Swahili house of the Eastern African coast 
and the Bertha house of Ethiopia. They are not properly speaking archaeological cases: 
the first one is an ethno-historical study and the second an ethnographic one, but 
research was carried out in both cases by archaeologists with archaeological 
methodologies and questions in mind. 
 
(h2) THE SWAHILI HOUSE: HIERARCHICAL ORDER  
 The Swahili house is a perfect example of how social values are materialized in 
space and hence internalized through daily interaction with the built environment by 
those who use it. The Swahili live in the coast of Eastern Africa, from southern Somalia 
to northern Mozambique, and they are a mixture of native Africans and Arab merchants, 
who traded in this area since the 8th century AD (Horton and Middleton 2000). Their 
hybrid culture takes elements from the indigenous cultures and the foreign traders. 
Swahili houses of the patrician group (waungwana) have a rectangular layout and two 
floors, as opposed to the circular huts prevailing in Eastern Africa. Also, unlike 
traditional houses in the region, they are substantially built in coral, last several 
generations and are richly adorned with elaborate geometrical carvings. The possession 
of long residence in a single place (ustaarabu) is considered to be a moral quality 
inherent to being Swahili—and different from the local “barbarians” (Horton and 
Middleton 2000: 179). For a start, then, living in a coral house made their waungwana 
owners feel different (and superior) from the surrounding African communities and 
Swahili commoners. But also anxious: they were in a minority position in relation to 
both the African and Islamic worlds and to disenfranchised communities (slaves). The 
solidarity between the waungwana and their fear of the outside was materially 
expressed in the bridges and internal passageways that connected the patricians’ houses 
and allowed the Swahili to avoid the street and present a united front towards strangers 
(Donley-Reid 1982: 65). It is logical that this anxiety was also expressed through rituals 
related to the boundaries of the house (Donley-Reid 1987: 189) and an obsession with 
purity. The house, besieged by the polluted city, is the locus of purity par excellence, 
but this has to be continuously maintained through cleansing, whitewashing, prayer and 
ritual observance (Horton and Middleton 2000: 183). Purity is a quintessential moral 
quality of women, too, who are strongly linked to the house (as in other Islamic 
societies). Women share other moral qualities with the house, such as shame and beauty 
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(ibid.). In a sense, the materiality of the house determined the woman’s personhood and 
identity. Inside the Swahili house, the female mind, body and spatial order are bound 
together.  
 The house was not the residence of the waungwana only. Female slaves 
(madada) and concubines shared the home with their masters. The built space was 
loaded with explicit and implicit meanings and it was used in daily practice to show 
everybody her or his place within the house and within society at large. Thus, the lower 
storey—where the slaves lived and slept on the floor on mats—had unplastered and 
undecorated walls. Slaves were considered unclean and therefore did not need any 
devices to protect them (Donley-Reid 1982: 66). The dirtiest and less valued part of the 
house, the kitchen, was also located in the lower floor. The masters lived in the richly 
decorated upper storey and slept in beds. Within this storey, polluting activities (such as 
sexual intercourse, childbearing and cleaning of corpses) took place in the most 
secluded room of the house, the ndani, which was the most lavishly decorated part of 
the house as well (Donley-Reid 1987: 187-188). Valsiner (2008: 69) notes that the 
meaning of decoration is often linked with the notion of non-functional or excessive 
kind of decoration. This certainly applies to the baroquely ornamented ndani—and 
index of a strong fear of pollution. 
  The different qualities of the materials employed in the construction of the 
house, the difference in textures, decorations and furniture, the differential location of 
the masters and servants’ rooms, all helped to make people internalize through daily 
practice the social order of the Swahili world. In addition, some ceremonies made social 
order even more clear and redundant for those who inhabited the house. The ritual 
kutolewande took place 40 days after the birth of a free-born child (Donley-Reid 1982: 
70). The baby was then carried around the house, from the ndani, where he or she was 
born, to the rest of the rooms in what can be considered a prototypical “social guidance 
drama” (Valsiner 2007: 233). The mother, the female relatives and the slaves 
accompany the baby in his or her first tour of the social world that he or she will inhabit. 
The child is shown the rooms, their function, the artifacts and furniture associated to 
each room and the people who use them. The tour ends in the entrance door where, if 
the baby is a girl, she is told that the outside belongs to men only. That will be the limit 
of her world. Naturally, the ritual is only symbolic for the child, but it helps to 
emphasize in a powerful way the social order that is reproduced in practice by the 
household members every day. It also marks the beginning of the slow and long process 
of enculturation for the child.  
 
(h2) THE BERTHA HOUSE: ORDER WITHOUT HIERARCHY 
 The Swahili are a deeply hierarchical society and with a complex state religion. 
The case of the Bertha (González-Ruibal 2006b), who live in western Ethiopia and 
eastern Sudan is quite different. The Bertha are Muslim, too, but their concern with 
pollution and purity is very different—and less pressing. They are a rather egalitarian 
community, with little social differentiation. Like the Swahili, the Bertha are a hybrid 
people as well, heavily influenced by the Islamic Sudan. The equivalent of Swahili 
patricians in Bertha land was the Watawit, the traditional ruling class, a mixture of Arab 
merchants and local women. However, the indigenous element has always had an 
overwhelming weight among the Bertha and an egalitarian ethos tended to curtail the 
most visible manifestations of power. The order of domestic space among the Bertha 
has little to do with the anxieties of the Swahili. However, the Bertha house is also a 
structuring structure and a faithful representation of the cosmos.  
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 The house itself is much simpler, from an architectural point of view, than the 
Swahili mansions. Although there are three different types of houses (González-Ruibal 
2006: 383-384), they all share some features, such as a circular layout, bamboo walls 
and thatched roofs. Externally, they are very recognizable, even from afar, due to their 
particular rooftop (shimbir), crowned with four long and thin poles. The rooftop and the 
long stick planted near the house to protect it against the evil spirits of thunder are 
symbols of the Bertha identity. They have an “emblemic” use, that is “they transmit a 
clear message to a define target population about conscious affiliation or identity” 
(Wiessner 1983: 257). However, the most important material elements that sustain the 
Bertha’s identity are neither explicit nor representational.  
 Despite their regional variations, all Bertha houses follow a similar spatial logic, 
that is deeply imprinted into the Bertha’s mind and that regulates their cultural behavior 
and their practical understanding of the world (González-Ruibal 2006b: 392-397). As in 
other vernacular African traditions (Preston Blier 1987), the Bertha house is 
anthropomorphic: the roof (alu) is the head of the house; the space indoors, the stomach 
(iyu); the entrance, the mouth (ndu); the poles flanking the entrance, the eyes (are, 
which also means “face”); the rest of the poles are the feet (khu), and the rear part of the 
house the back (gundi). This perception of the house as a human body has far-reaching 
consequences, because it means that the regionalization of the body (Giddens 1984: 124) 
is transferred to the domestic space, with all its implicit meanings and connotations. 
Like the human body, the house is divided into two main parts: the front and the back 
(FIGURE 8).  
 The front is where all human communication and relations take place: it is the 
area of the sight (are, eyes) and the speech (ndu means both mouth and language in 
Bertha). It is also the place of knowledge (are p’adiya, lit. “eye strong”, means “wise”). 
In front of the house, men gather to drink coffee early in the morning, women chat and 
care for the small children, men weave baskets and bamboo mats and women make 
pottery. Rituals and ceremonies also occur in the frontal space: Islamic praying, 
rainmaking activities, traditional sacrifices, wedding rites, beer drinking in working 
parties, etc. The space is kept clean by women, who sweep the floor at least twice a day. 
The rear of the house, on the contrary, is a space devoid of activities, people and 
artifacts. It is the place of death and dirt, where rubbish is thrown away, where small 
children were traditionally buried, menstruating women urinate, and rituals related to 
the exorcism of evil spirits take place. The back of the house is never swept. The same 
front-back organization is replicated indoors, with clean, social activities taking place in 
the frontal area (such as sleeping, entertaining guests and making coffee), and dirty ones 
in the rear area (such as brewing beer and cooking fermented food).  
 For the Bertha, then, as for the Swahili, ordering the domestic space is not an 
abstract activity that can be verbalized and rationalized in an explicit way. It basically 
works in practice. Practical logic enables the organization of “all thoughts, perceptions 
and actions by means of a few generative principles, which are closely interrelated and 
constitute a practically integrated whole” (Bourdieu 1990: 86). It has often been said 
that the organization of space among egalitarian, small-scale societies is much more 
flexible and less scripted than among hierarchical ones. Yet even egalitarian societies 
live in a material world that precludes certain actions in certain spaces and favors others. 
Under the apparent chaos and disorder of the Bertha house lays a powerful order that is 
no less strict, even if it has fewer rules, than the one enforced by the Swahili house. A 
Bertha woman would never, ever, make pots behind her house. The relation between 
back space, dirt and death is heavily imprinted in her mind from her earlier childhood, 
even if she cannot render those relations explicit in speech.  
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 Both the Swahili and the Bertha house, then, allow knowing the order of the 
world for those who inhabit them. Furthermore, both houses are concerned with purity 
and pollution. The difference is that the logic of the Swahili house—as a hierarchical 
society—is basically concerned with contamination caused by the violation of the socio-
political order (masters and slaves, locals and foreigners), whereas the central theme in 
the Bertha house—as an egalitarian community—is pollution brought about by 
disturbances in the cosmological order (life and dead, good and evil, society and the 
Other).  
 In sum, built space is crucial in the psychological development of human beings 
within any particular culture. People—and especially political visionaries—instinctively 
know that. It is not by chance that social engineering has always aimed at changing 
architecture for changing people’s minds. This was the case with Soviet buildings: 
Victor Buchli (1999) studied the evolution of the Narkomfin building in Moscow, an 
attempt at achieving the communalization of daily life by eliminating petit bourgeois 
domesticity. Nonetheless, other attempts at transforming ways of thinking and behaving 
through space can be counter-hegemonic. That is the case with the architecture of the 
Pueblo Indians after the 1680 revolt and the utopian communities of the first half of the 
19th century in New England, studied by Robert Preucel (2006). After the Pueblo revolt, 
the Cochiti leaders of the rebellion founded villages endowed with a double plaza that 
encoded the cosmological and social principles of the Cochiti worldview, so as to fix 
and make effective in practice the revitalization discourse, which was critical with the 
exploitative system of the Spanish empire. Similarly, the followers of 
Transcendentalism who founded utopian communities relied heavily on architecture to 
create a new social order—and a new individual—that stood against incipient industrial 
capitalism and its dehumanizing practices. Culture, according to Shweder and Miller 
(1993: 512) is “that subset of possible or available meanings, which by virtue of 
enculturation... has so given shape to the psychological processes of individuals in a 
society that those meanings have become, for those individuals, indistinguishable from 
experience itself”. The built space, in any society, goes a long way in achieving that 
seamless conflation of meaning and lived experience.  
(h1) MEMORY AND MATERIAL CULTURE 
With the rise of cognitive archaeology in the 1980s emerged the interest for material 
culture as a form of memory container. Colin Renfrew (1998), one of the main 
proponents of the paradigm, argued that the appearance of the first agrarian societies (ca. 
9500 BC in the Near East) coincided with a new cognitive phase in the development of 
the human mind, characterized by external symbolic storage employing material culture. 
This phase (the Neolithic in archaeological terms) would lie between two periods 
previously described by Merlin Donald (1991): the linguistic and mythic culture of the 
early Homo sapiens and the theoretic culture of literate societies. The materials put to 
mnemonic uses varied with the development of agrarian societies. Probably, the earliest 
containers of memory were houses, especially in the Near East (Hodder and Cessford 
2004) and the Balkans (Borič 2003). In Western Europe, tombs became the focus of 
collective memory (Edmonds 1999), later to be replaced by artifacts that were ritually 
deposited in public ceremonies (Bradley 1990). In places like Mesoamerica and North 
America, cultic spaces materialized collective remembrance among early farmers and 
complex hunter-gatherers (e.g. Shady Solís et al. 2000; Pauketat and Alt 2003). More 
generally, the diversification of material culture with the Neolithic and the appearance 
of new supports to convey messages (such as pottery, textiles and architecture) and the 
generalization of old ones (sculpture and painting), certainly favored the storage of 
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memory. The semiotic world of the first agriculturalists, then, was very different from 
that of the hunter-gatherers, with its limited amount of human-made symbolic 
containers. Some of the mnemonic devices developed by early agrarian and sedentary 
societies developed through time to such an extent so as to evolve into writing: this is 
the case of the Mesopotamian tablets of the late fourth millennium BC (Rodríguez 
Mayorgas 2010: 97-103). Other mnemonic devices were very complex but did not 
become proper writing system, such as the Inca knotted strings (Cole 1998: 168: 
Rodríguez Mayorgas 2010: 104-107).  
 
H3) BEYOND EXTERNAL STORAGE 
 The idea of material culture as a form of mnemonic external storage has been 
under attack from different quarters, including some cognitive archaeologists. 
Malafouris, for instance, considers the computational model of cognition (based on a 
process of encoding-storage-retrieval) does not adequately explain the mnemonic role of 
objects (also Thomas [1998], from an interpretive perspective). Artifacts, writes 
Malafouris (2004: 57) “remind you, sometimes even force you to remember, without 
including the content of what precisely is to be remembered” unlike texts or information 
contained in a hard disk. The most serious objection to the theory of external symbolic 
storage is that it does not truly consider a dialogical self. It envisions culture (and 
cognition) as something that takes places in the head and that is projected into a passive 
world (see above “Material culture, materiality, cognition”). Recently, archaeologists 
have been more interested in how places and things are suffused with memory and the 
effect that this has on people (Van Dyke and Alcock 2003; Jones 2007), rather than in 
the way particular objects or monuments are explicitly codified so as to store specific 
memories. This is related to the growing interest in the social sciences on collective 
memory. It is now widely accepted that memory is not something exclusively individual, 
but socially shared (Connerton 1989), as Maurice Halbwachs (1994 [1925]) proposed 
more than 80 years ago. In fact, the archaeological record preserves more instances of 
social remembrance, from monuments to fossilized daily routines, than personal (or 
group) mnemonic devices. This turning away from the notion of symbolic storage is 
also related to a wider awareness of the peculiar mnemonic nature of things, as opposed 
to texts. Things are ontologically closer to what Connerton (1989: 72-73) calls 
incorporating practices than to inscribing ones. Inscribing practices are devices for 
storing and retrieving information (books, computers, sound tapes). Incorporating 
practices imply the intentional or unintentional transmission of information primordially 
through bodily posture, which is, in turn, tightly interwoven with technology and 
artifacts (Mauss 1973). 
 Andrew Clark (2008: 14) comments that certain Alzheimer’s sufferers maintain 
an unexpected high level of normal, independent functioning. Their success is explained 
by the use they make of diverse external aids such as labels, memory books, diaries and 
leaving important objects in open view. This is, for Clark, just an extreme example of 
the normal use of external aids (computers, compasses, maps). The author, however, 
like other psychologists and cognitive scientists (Beach 1993; Klumb 2001), focuses on 
explicit and conscious cognitive uses of material culture, those that are closer to the idea 
of things as external symbolic storage. Yet we are not able of orienting ourselves just 
when we use a map, read a history book or write a laundry list. We live in a material 
environment that is saturated of social meanings and memory traces. Even if we do not 
want to remember, artifacts force us to.  This is because, as Boesch (1991: 331) has 
noted: 
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our objectual surroundings establish and environment of meanings, often 
delicate and intimate, expressing itself even in unreflected banalities ...the 
lavender sachet in the lingerie drawer, symbolising, without us realising it, 
the blending of opposing principles, such as the enclosed space and the 
open air, the civilised and the natural, the daily and the unusual [my 
emphasis].   
 
 
This is why we throw away our ex-lover’s possessions, despite not being mnemonic 
aids proper—and were never intended to be (in the way a grocery list or a knot in the 
handkerchief are). The lover’s possessions are indexes that remind us of his or her 
presence, as the lavender sachet brings out memories of nature and openness. The things 
Clark mentions in his example are (with the exception of the objects put in a visible 
place) symbols; but material culture, as we have already seen, works more often as an 
index (Jones 2007: 22-26). There lies the power of things: they keep remembering us 
other things, people, places and events to which they are associated, whether we want it 
or not. If we scale up and go from personal cases to society at large, we can get an idea 
of the important role that materiality plays in shaping collective remembrance, which is 
in turn crucial for shaping our present (and future) behavior. This mnemonic and 
prospective power of things is well exemplified in the following examples. As in 
previous sections, I will resort to both ancient and modern cultures.  
 
H2) KEEPING HISTORY COLD: MATERIALITY AND MEMORY IN 
PREHISTORIC SOCIETIES   
  Çatalhöyük, in modern Turkey, is one of the most important early agrarian 
villages studied by archaeologists (Hodder 2006). In its main phase of occupation, 
around the seventh millennium BC, it could have hosted up to 8,000 individuals. The 
village had many mud huts, tightly packed together, with no streets or plazas: people 
entered their house from the roof.  According to Hodder and Cessford (2004: 22), in 
Çatalhöyük,  
 
“instead of social rules being imposed by centralized authorities 
manipulating public rituals... the reproduction of dominant groups (elders 
or lineage heads) was intimately tied to the construction of bodily routines 
that were repeated in daily house practices over days, months, years, 
decades, centuries, and even millennia”.  
 
One of these practices was the replastering of walls, which was carried out annually and 
for up to a hundred years before the house was completely rebuilt (carefully following 
the old plan). Other repetitive activities, such as sweeping and plastering certain floors 
or burying people under them, were important in the processes of enculturation through 
practice, but also in perpetuating in time meaningful, ancestral ways of doing things. 
Hodder and Cessford (2004: 31) argue that daily practice and memory were inseparable 
in Çatalhöyük, because social regulations were not simply imposed, but constructed 
through habituation practices, which, in a non-literate society, play the same role as 
writing in the construction of social memory. Paul Connerton (1989) has explored this 
duality through the concepts of inscribing and incorporating practices. The second are 
particularly characteristic of non-literate peoples. Although Connerton referred basically 
to bodily gestures and performances, we have to include here the use and manipulation 
of artifacts as well as the artifacts (including architecture) that shape bodily practices.  
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The fact that houses follow exactly the same plan for hundreds of years proves their 
fundamental role in preserving collective memory. It also reveals the prospective 
qualities of material culture, as technical decisions taken at a certain point in time were 
still having an effect upon the regulation of society and community life two thousands 
years later. Sometimes even specific iconic decorations (such as depictions of bulls) 
were repeated through several phases spanning hundreds of years (Hodder and Cessford 
2004: 35), a phenomenon that guarantees the long-term transmission of mythological 
knowledge. Furthermore, in Çatalhöyük there are some houses whose mnemonic role 
seems to be more prominent than in others: they have long sequences of occupation, 
elaborate decorations and many burials. They were formerly interpreted as shrines and 
today as houses of powerful lineages (Hodder 2006). At any rate, they epitomize the 
need for preserving memory that is present in every other house and reveal the link that 
existed between memory and power.  
 The logic of Çatalhöyük is present in other Neolithic communities in Europe and 
the Near East. A compelling example is that of the so-called Linear Pottery Culture 
(LPC), which represents the expansion of early farmers from Hungary to eastern France 
between 5500 and 5000 BC. Despite its vast territory, the LPC is extremely 
homogeneous in house form, burial practices and pottery decoration. Jones (2007: 93-
105) considers that this homogeneity is related to specific memory practices, which are 
again clear in the domestic sphere. The long rectangular houses had their doorways 
oriented towards the previous area of settlement (the LPC people expanded from 
Hungary towards France), as if remembering their origins, and they preserve the 
original layout for centuries—“a kind of mythological archetype” (Jones 2007: 103). 
These material practices, in Jones’ opinion, provided a way of coping with new 
environments. Cultural memory enabled people to move forward while remaining 
attached to the past (Jones 2007: 100). I would argue that the memory practices of Çatal 
Höyük and the Linear Pottery Culture are best understood as mechanisms to “keep 
history cold”. Jan Assmann (2001: 35) suggests that in all societies there are devices 
whose purpose is to maintain the “cyclical time of regeneration”. In egalitarian, non-
literate communities mechanisms of regeneration prevail, in opposition to what Assman 
calls the “loci of history”, which account for events and change. The latter are to be 
found in some state societies, where transformation is perceived as positive, and 
especially in modernity after the 15th century.  
 
H2) DESTRUCTION AS MEMORY PRACTICE  
 Material memory is not necessarily based on constructive processes. Destruction 
can be a positive way of maintaining memories (Rowlands 1993), provided that it takes 
place in a dramatic, ritualized setting and is regularly repeated. A good example is the 
destruction by fire of Neolithic mud houses in the Balkans (Stevanovic 1997). Every 
few years, houses were destroyed and then built anew following the previous layout, in 
what can be considered as an act of cyclical regeneration. Another case of social 
remembrance through destruction is the malanggan. The people of New Ireland make 
very elaborate funerary sculptures (called malanggan) that take months to be finished 
and require great skills. The ritual itself lasts a few hours and, after that, the wooden 
sculptures are left at the mercy of the wind and rain in ritual areas (Küchler 2002). 
Memory is thus deposited in the technical cycle as a whole, which includes the creation 
of the statue and use, but also its abandonment and eventual disappearance. Rowlands 
(1993: 149) describes other contexts in which the destruction of material culture serves 
to remember, such as the deposits of bronze objects that were ritually buried in Europe 
during the Late Bronze Age (1200-800 BC), or the famous potlatch of the Kwakiutl 
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Indians of the British Columbia, in which large amounts of commodities are not only 
given away by wealthy patrons, but also burnt and destroyed.  The ceremonies in which 
artifacts are destroyed, buried or abandoned are, in all cases mentioned, dramatic 
enough so as to be deeply impressed into collective memory.  
 However, destruction can also be an effective way of erasing memory. As we 
saw in the section of space and order, people are often instinctively aware of the agency 
of material culture in shaping social life. They also know that things transmit memory 
and that with memory come certain moral values and cultural predispositions: hence the 
widespread phenomenon of damnatio memoriae since Antiquity. The idea is to cut short 
forever not just a particular remembrance, but also the possibilities of repetition, 
because it is repetition (Assmann’s “time of regeneration”) that makes the past always 
present. Thus, the destruction of malanggan, potlatch commodities or bronze axes was 
not actually aimed at putting an end to something (those particular things), but to 
regenerate something else (society or the cosmos). It is the cycle of production and 
destruction that maintains memory in those contexts. The problem is when destruction 
itself becomes an end, that is, when the central point is to obliterate a cultural world and 
start a new one ex nihilo. The annihilating thrust implies a radical change in the notion 
of temporality, from a cyclical time to a linear one, with millennial or teleological 
connotations. It is not by chance that revolutionary programs based on destruction often 
imply the emergence of linear notions of time (or even the very notion of time): that is 
the case with Christianity (Cullmann 1964: 51-60) and modernity. Significantly, the 
French Revolution and Fascist Italy simultaneously inaugurated new calendars and tried 
to raze previous cultural landscapes (Zerubavel 1977; Bosworth 2005: 201). The 
purpose of destruction is to obliterate the old material civilization and the old ways of 
thinking which were embedded in it.  
 This exactly is what is happening in the more traditionally parts of Spain under 
the impact of modernity. In Galicia, in particular, the destruction of the traditional 
material environment has acquired enormous proportions (González-Ruibal 2005). This 
is due to the traumatic character of the process of modernization in the region: hundreds 
of thousands of peasants were forced to emigrate to other European countries and North 
America in search for jobs. During their stay abroad, Galicians were exposed to a 
radically different material culture in places like New York and Buenos Aires. In a 
strange and often hostile social environment, their remembrance of their birthplace was 
heavily tinged with nostalgia and affection; a highly idealized ancestral homeland 
emerged from their daydreaming.  
 This ideal image suffered a hard reality-check when they returned to Galicia 
from the late 1970s onwards. The idealization process was reversed upon arrival and the 
birthplace began to be characterized in negative terms, as a backward, oppressive 
locale—the source of all moral and material miseries that forced people to emigrate. Yet 
it was not enough with destroying in the mind the memory of the cozy traditional home. 
The entire cultural landscape had to be shattered and replaced by a new one, free of the 
social and mental constrictions that characterized the premodern environment. Using 
Sigmund Freud’s terminology, we can say that what the Galicians suffered was not a 
process of mourning caused by the disappearance of something that had been loved, but 
melancholia, which is marked by ambivalence towards the object (loved and hated at 
the same time):  
 
“Just as mourning impels the ego to renounce the object by declaring its 
death... each individual battle of ambivalence loosens the fixation of the 
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libido upon the object by devaluing, disparaging and, so to speak, even 
killing it” (Freud 2006: 324).  
 
Devaluing and even killing the object that summoned traumatic memories was what the 
Galicians did. They engaged in a rage of destruction of the old material world: from 
plows to houses (FIGURE 9). The new material culture exemplify the change from a 
culture where a relational self prevailed and where memory was communally built and 
transmitted within the community to a society of independent selves, where individual 
memories—successful biographies—try to impose themselves in the cultural landscape. 
Mechanisms to shape and regulate the relational self and preserve memory (traditional 
clothes, agricultural implements for collective work, vernacular houses) were replaced 
by monuments to the individual self, material memories of personal triumphs 
(expensive cars, luxurious modernist houses). Nevertheless, the relationship with the 
past, as in every melancholic process, is ambivalent. Traditional artifacts are often not 
destroyed, but just left to decay. Something of the old love prevails and haunts the 
former peasants. 
 The Galician case is only an extreme example of the forms of oblivion that are 
embedded in late modern materiality. For Paul Connerton (2009), late modernity is 
characterized by a particular regime of forgetting that is enforced in everyday life 
through the built environment. The scale of human settlement, the production of speed 
and the destruction of the built environment generate a particular “cultural amnesia”  
(Connerton 2009: 99). Whereas medieval and early modern cities used to have 
conspicuous landmarks that created an effect of spatial cohesion and places of gathering 
that fostered social cohesion, new cities are formless, segregated spaces and, for that 
reason, unmemorable and unsocial. Besides, the continuous refashioning of the built 
environment prevents any possible social recollection of shared places. We might say 
that supermodern cities fail to transmit memory, but we may as well argue that they 
succeed in creating forgetfulness: Connerton (2009: 125) makes the point that the 
production of oblivion is intrinsic of the political economy of late capitalism. Cultural 
amnesia is not produced by accident, but by a necessity of the system—so that we 
forget where things come from (González-Ruibal and Hernando 2010). The question 
that emerges from the study of material memory practices in late modernity is: How 
does living in a post-mnemonic culture affect human cognition?  
(h1)  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Archaeology works with more cultural variation than any other social science, since 
archaeological methods can be used to understand all prehistoric, historic and 
contemporary societies from the beginning of humankind to the present. The 
possibilities for cultural comparison are almost infinite and differences often emerge 
when contrasting opposite contexts. However, archaeologists agree that working with 
the past is just one of the defining characteristics of their discipline. The other, and 
perhaps more important, is its focus on materiality. In this chapter, I have tried to show 
the great relevance that material culture has in shaping our perceptions and experiences 
of the world. Material things are a crucial component of the “extended mind” (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998) and this fact is enjoying increasing recognition by psychologists and 
cognitive scientists. As we have seen, Cole (1998: 144) argues that things are the 
quintessential constituents of culture due to their twofold character, simultaneously 
material and ideal. Here, I have argued that a third dimension of things has to be taken 
into account in order to understand their relevance in shaping the social mind: 
temporality. Things from the past have a continuing effect in the future. Our 
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experiences are framed by an inherited material environment, sometimes hundreds or 
even thousands of years old. From this point of view, archaeology is doubly pertinent, 
because—unlike other disciplines engaged in the study of things—it deals both with 
materiality and with time. For cultural psychologists and archaeologists it should not be 
difficult to find a common ground. After all, they are interested in similar phenomena as 
mediated by culture. The development and constitution of the self in relation to society, 
the social shaping of emotions, the way the built environment affects human experience 
and the material frame of memory practices are the four themes that I have chosen to 
explore in this chapter, due to their meaningful and manifold ramifications.   
 Cultural psychology could benefit from studying things with an archeological 
sensibility, that is, with an understanding of the agency of material culture, its 
inseparability from human beings and its temporality. Some new lines of research for an 
archaeologically-inspired cultural psychology that takes things seriously could be the 
following: 
1- The interactions between human psychological processes and material culture 
beyond cognitive technologies and explicit symbolical objects. Psychologists 
interested in material culture have often focused on explicit cognitive or mnemonic 
technologies and artifacts—maps, computers, GPS, compasses. Here, I have tried to 
show that many other types of cultural objects are involved in both social and spatial 
orientation and are, therefore, worth of study by psychologists. In fact, other categories 
of cultural objects, such as houses or cars have been taken into account by cultural 
psychologists recently (Valsiner 2008: 23). Their point in common is that they are 
artifacts explicitly inscribed with meaning. The focus is in people openly making 
statements with objects. Although those studies are certainly an important and exciting 
line of research, it would be interesting to look at other kinds of artifacts, which are less 
obviously loaded with meaning. This implies a turn from explicit to implicit meanings, 
from the symbolic and iconic to the indexical. To make better sense of the indexical, of 
unconscious traces and practical behavior, psychologists have to span their range of 
research and include things that do not seem too relevant or meaningful at first sight, 
things that are overlooked or taken for granted by human actors. Archaeologists know 
well that every single object counts, no matter how humble.  
2- Systems of artifacts involved in psychological processes. Things cannot be 
understood in isolation or out of context: archaeologists and anthropologist of 
technology know that we have to explore entire material inventories and their structural 
relations (Baudrillard 1968; Lemonnier 1992; González-Ruibal 2006a). As signs are 
only meaningful in relation to other signs, artifacts are only meaningful in relation to 
other artifacts (including the human body). Thus, cars have to be explored in relation to 
urban space and houses, but also in relation to late modern technologies of the self, such 
as weblogs and cloth, and cloth, in turn, has to be understood as related to furniture and 
cell phones. Real things have also to be confronted with virtual things and with the 
products of the cultural and moral imagination. How do artifacts that are explicitly 
encoded with meaning and artifacts that work in practice relate to each other? How do 
they interact to frame daily experience?  
3- The temporality of things. People are born to a material milieu that they have not 
created but that deeply affect their being. The psychological development of individuals 
takes place in a cultural landscape saturated of meaningful memory cues, some of them 
extremely old, some very recent. Does the human mind develop differently in heavily 
material and conservative historical environments and in landscapes where memory is 
swept away every generation or not materialized in the first place? How do different 
memory practices and temporalities of things affect the way people perceive themselves, 
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society and the world? Thus, whereas Europeans live in cultural landscapes that have 
grown through accretion of diverse material pasts, the materiality of which is considered 
important for the present (at least since early modern times), the Buddhist tradition 
tends to regenerate the past by destroying or altering its materiality, which is not valued, 
and by rebuilding it anew (Byrne 1995). Also, how do the different layers of time have 
an effect in people? The issue of time is inextricable from memory: What is the role of 
material culture in creating and reconfiguring habit, cognitive and personal memory 
(Connerton 2009: 139-141)? What is the relation between open commemorative 
practices and unconscious mnemonic traces? 
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CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Trajan’s column in Rome. It depicts the conquest of Dacia (modern Romania) 
by Emperor Trajan between 101 and 106. Material culture here works like a text that 
can be read.  
Figure 2. Decoration of a Gumuz granary in western Ethiopia. An indexical sign that 
works in practice. 
Figure 3. A group of Komo from western Ethiopia drink beer from a common pot in a 
working party. 
Figure 4. A megalithic tomb from Galicia (Spain) after excavation. Ritual activities took 
place around the mound, in front of the entrance and inside between 3800 and 2700 BC.  
Figure 5.  A decorated slab from the megalithic tomb of Knowth in Ireland.  
Figure 6. Victorian cemetery in Glasgow: isolated monuments to the individual self. 
Figure 7. Between the individual and the relational self: a cemetery in Galicia (Spain). 
Figure 8. The Bertha house: a structuring structure. 
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Figure 9. A traumatic breakage with a relational identity: forgetting the past in a 
Galician village.  
 
